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TORT-PARENTAL IMMUNITY-Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d 411,
610 P.2d 891 (1980).
Two-year-old Chanci Ellioff was a passenger in an automobile driven
by her mother, Jolene Sutterlin. The Sutterlin vehicle struck the rear of
another vehicle. As a result of the accident, Chanci Ellioff suffered severe
injuries. I Through a guardian ad litem, the child sued her mother and the
driver of the other vehicle2 for their alleged negligence in causing the
accident.3 The trial court granted defendant Sutterlin's motion for sum-
mary judgment, stating that a parent is immune from an action by a child
for injuries caused by the parent's tortious conduct. On appeal, in Mer-
rick v. Sutterlin,4 the Washington Supreme Court reversed the judgment,
holding that the doctrine of parental tort immunity does not apply to a
parent whose negligent driving has injured her child.
The Merrick decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the court
overturned Stevens v. Murphy, 5 which had severely limited the ability of
a child to recover damages caused by his parent's negligent operation of
an automobile. Second, although the court criticized the doctrine of par-
ental tort immunity, it declined to abolish it. Thus, the extent to which the
immunity will be retained in future cases is unclear.
This note outlines the origins of the doctrine of parentalftort immunity
and its development in Washington, placing special emphasis on the doc-
trine's underlying policies and their applicability in automobile negli-
gence cases. This note then discusses the problems which may arise from
the Merrick court's failure to abolish the parental immunity entirely.
Looking to the future, this note suggests that the immunity be abolished
in favor of a standard of care recognizing the legal duty of a parent to act
as a reasonably prudent parent.
1. Ellioff suffered multiple traumatic injuries, including a fractured skull, cerebral concussion,
brain damage, severe abrasions, contusions, and lacerations, as well as mental, psychological and
emotional injuries. Brief for Appellant, Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wn. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980), at
3.
2. The other driver, Robert Ronish, settled with plaintiff and was no longer a party when the case
was appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. Id.
3. The mother had been tried and convicted of negligent driving. Merrick, 93 Wn. 2d at 412, 610
P.2d at 891.
4. 93Wn.2d411,610P.2d891 (1980).




A. Origin of the Doctrine of Parental Tort Immunity
In its broadest form, parental tort immunity prevents an unemancipated
minor from suing his parent or parents for personal injuries caused by the
tortious conduct of either or both parents.6 The doctrine was not part of
the English common law. 7 Rather, it originated in three American cases
that have become known as the "great trilogy.' '8
In Hewellette v. George,9 the Mississippi Supreme Court wrote the first
opinion holding that parents are immune from tort liability to their chil-
dren. In Hewellette, a minor child sought damages from her mother for
the mother's wrongful commitment of the child to an insane asylum. De-
nying recovery, the court reasoned that the peace of society and the re-
pose of families dictate that a minor child may not assert a claim for inju-
ries caused by a parent. 10
In the second member of the great trilogy, McKelvey v. McKelvey, I
the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit in which a
child sought recovery against her father and stepmother for alleged cruel
and inhuman treatment. The court announced, without citation to author-
ity, that the parental tort immunity doctrine was recognized at common
law. 12
In Roller v. Roller, 13 the third member of the great trilogy, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court heard an appeal from a judgment in which a minor
child was granted recovery against her father, who had raped her. The
6. The converse is also barred by the doctrine-a parent cannot sue his child. For the purpose of
this note, it is assumed that the child is suing the parent. All of the parent-child tort litigation that has
reached the Washington Supreme Court has been initiated by a guardian ad litem on behalf of the
child and against his parent.
7. Merrick, 93 Wn. 2d at 412, 610 P.2d at 891. See note 22 infra.
8. Tort Actions between Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, 26 Mo. L.
REV. 152, 182(1961).
9. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (commonly cited as Hewlett v. George).
10. Id., 9 So. at 887. The court stated that the only protection a minor child should have from
parental wrongdoing is through the state criminal laws.
11. 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
12. The court stated:
At common law the right of the father to the control and custody of his infant child grew out of
the corresponding duty on his part to maintain, protect, and educate it. . . . In case parental
power was abused, the child had no civil remedy against the father for the personal injuries
inflicted. . . . So far as we can discover, this rule of the common law has never been ques-
tioned in any of the courts of this country.
Id.
In making its decision, the Tennessee court also relied upon an analogy to husband-wife tort immu-
nity. Such an analogy is misplaced. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text infra.
13. 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
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court reversed the judgment. With questionable logic, the court stated
that the abused child's action was barred because of "the interest that
society has in preserving harmony in domestic relations."' 14 The court
declared that at common law it is "well established that a minor child
cannot sue a parent in tort." 15 The court explained that the lack of judicial
precedent for parental tort immunity was because the principle was so
well understood that few had ever attempted to litigate the issue. 16
After the great trilogy, courts across the country uniformly adopted the
doctrine of parental tort immunity. Soon, however, courts began to ques-
tion the rationale for the rule and to create exceptions where parental
immunity could no longer be supported. 17
B. The Borst Analysis: Limited Justification for Parental Immunity
Since the creation of parental tort immunity, American courts favoring
the doctrine have offered five major reasons for its existence. In Borst v.
Borst, 18 the Washington Supreme Court's analysis suggests that none of
these reasons warrant application of the immunity in cases involving au-
tomobile negligence.
In Borst, decided a half century after Roller v. Roller, 19 an unemanci-
pated minor had been permanently injured by his father's allegedly negli-
gent operation of a truck while in the furtherance of his partnership's
business. 20 Through a guardian ad litem, the child sued his father, but the
14. Id. at 243,79 P. at 788.
15. Id. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
16. Id. at 246, 79 P. at 789. The only case authority cited was Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss.
703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The court in Roller apparently failed to uncover the holding of McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 11 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
17. For example, suit has always been allowed when the minor was emancipated at the time of
the injury. Tort Actions between Members of the Family-Husband & Wife-Parent & Child, supra
note 8, at 194. Suit has been allowed by some courts where defendant has liability insurance. E.g.,
Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). If the negligent parent had died, a few courts
allowed the minor child to sue the estate since family harmony was no longer endangered by the
child's suit. E.g., Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68 (Mo. 1960) (en banc). Some courts have
also abrogated the rule in cases in which the conduct is intentional or willful, wanton or reckless.
E.g., Brown v. Selby, 206 Tenn. 71, 332 S.W.2d 166 (1960) (intentional); Cowgill v. Boock, 189
Or. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950) (gross negligence and willful misconduct). Finally, some courts have
allowed suit where the tortious conduct arose from a business activity. E.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio
St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939). In essence, the creation of this last exception was the
limited issue before the court in Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). See notes
18-44 and accompanying text infra.
18. 41 Wn. 2d 642,251 P.2d 149(1952).
19. 37 Wash. 242,79 P. 788 (1905).
20. The child, a five-year-old boy, was playing with a cardboard box along the edge of the front
yard of the family home. He ventured out into the street with the box and was struck by a truck
operated by his father. 41 Wn. 2d at 643, 251 P.2d at 149.
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trial court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Washington court held
that the child could maintain the cause of action, 21 and thus created an
exception to the parental tort immunity doctrine established in Roller. Be-
fore announcing this doctrinal change, the Borst court undertook an ex-
tensive analysis of the principal arguments advanced for the immunity. 22
The reason most often given in support of parental tort immunity is the
public interest in maintaining family tranquility. 23 The rationale is that
harmony in domestic relations cannot be preserved if a child is allowed to
sue a parent in tort. 24 As the Borst court noted, this position ignores three
counterarguments. First, if the family's harmony has not already been
disrupted by the tort, that harmony is strong enough to withstand a suit.25
Second, when liability insurance is present, as is likely in automobile
cases, a parent is protected from ultimate financial responsibility for the
damages. 26 Thus, the family as a whole stands to gain from the child's
21. 41 Wn.2dat658,251 P.2dat t57.
22. The Borst court also reviewed the law up to the time of the Roller decision, and determined
that the Roller statement that the doctrine was part of the common law was "clearly erroneous." 41
Wn. 2d at 647, 251 P.2d at 151.
23. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
24. See, e.g., Luster v. Luster, 229 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438, 439 (1938): "Such actions, at
least when not collusive, would almost inevitably tend to the destruction of the peace and unity of
family life and to the impairment of parental authority and discipline."
25. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 650, 251 P.2d at 153. "In the comparatively rare case where a
child brings such an action, the likelihood is that either the peace of the home has already been
disturbed beyond repair, or that, because of the existing circumstances, the suit will not disturb exist-
ing tranquility." Id.
In Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972), the Washington Supreme Court abro-
gated husband-wife tort immunity. In doing so, the court also had to refute this family tranquility
argument.
On reflection, we are convinced that this [argument] is a conclusion without basis. If a state of
peace and tranquility exists between the spouses, then the situation is such that either no action
will be commenced or that the spouses-who are, after all, the best guardians of their own
peace and tranquility-will allow the action to continue only as long as their personal harmony
is not jeopardized. If peace and tranquility are nonexistent or tenuous to begin with, then the
law's imposition of a technical disability seems more likely to be a bone of contention than a
harmonizing factor.
Id. at 187, 500 P.2d at 774.
26. In ruling on immunity, the courts often discuss the role of insurance. The existence of insur-
ance does not create liability; however, its presence is of considerable significance in the decision to
abrogate immunity. E.g., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966). The argument
is that if a parent insures against misfortune due to his negligence, it is senseless to give this source of
compensation to the general public but to deny it to his own child. See Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N.W. 787, 790 (1927) (Crownhart, J., dissenting).
One may argue that not all parents have insurance or that the damages are beyond the coverage of
the policy, and thus in those cases, the family tranquility argument and the family exchequer argu-
ment, see notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra, are still valid. When there is no insurance cover-
age, however, it is unlikely that suit will be brought against the parent in the first place. James,
Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J. 549, 553 (1948).
See also Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971);
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suit. Indeed, family stability may be enhanced because the child receives
compensation that may not be available from the family's own resources.
Third, even if the possibility of discord is conceded, parent and child are
free to litigate contract-and property disputes;27 since the threat to family
peace is at least as great in these cases, it is inconsistent to prevent the
child's personal injury suit on the pretext of family harmony. 28
The second justification for the doctrine is that the ability of the parent
to discipline the child would be impaired by allowing the child's tort ac-
tion. 29 Yet, a child's action in property or contract30 may also challenge
parental authority. Moreover, any validity to the second justification is
absent in the situation where the activity, such as driving an automobile,
has nothing to do with parental authority and discipline over children. 31
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 52, 324 N.E.2d 338, 347, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 872 (1974)
(Jasen, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, two courts have abrogated parent-child tort immunity only to
the extent of the parent's liability insurance coverage. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339
N.E.2d 907, 909 (1975); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976).
The Washington Supreme Court has previously considered the existence of insurance in deciding
to abrogate an immunity. In Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wn. 2d 162, 260
P.2d 765 (1953), the court abrogated the immunity of charitable institutions. The court explicitly
stated that it is wholly immaterial whether an individual defendant has liability insurance. That the
protection afforded by liability insurance was generally available to charitable institutions was an
appropriate consideration, however. Id. at 172, 260 P.2d at 771. This same analysis should be ex-
tended to parental immunity for automobile negligence. Liability insurance is generally available;
that a particular parent is not insured is irrelevant to the court's decision.
Some insurers may attempt to exclude family members from an insured's policy coverage. If suc-
cessful, the above reliance upon insurance would be misplaced. The Washington Supreme Court,
however, has declared that family or household exclusion clauses in automobile insurance policies
are void as against public policy. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wiscomb, 95 Wn. 2d 373, -
P.2d- (1981).
27. See McCurdy, Torts between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030,
1056-58 (1930). E.g., King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130 (1938) (two minors allowed to
recover money from their mother because she had converted some gifts to the children into cash,
which she then lost in bad investments).
28. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 651,251 P.2d at 153, quoting Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566,
103 N.E.2d 743,748 (1952).
29. E.g., Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 A. 753, 755 (1929):
Authority in the parent to require obedience in the child is indispensable to the maintenance of
unity in the family. Anything which undermines this authority, brings discord into the family,
weakens its government, and disturbs its peace, is an injury to society and to the state. Few
things could bring about this unhappy condition more quickly or widen the breach between
parent and child further than the bringing of an action at law for personal injuries by a minor
child against the parent.
See also Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938).
30. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
31. The court in Borst responded to the discipline argument as follows:
The field of parental control and discipline covers such matters as the maintenance of the
home, chastisement, and no doubt other activities which need not here be delineated. But when
the parental activity whereby the child was injured has nothing to do with parental control and
discipline, a suit involving such activity cannot be said to undermine those sinews of family life.
41 Wn. 2d at 651,251 P.2d at 153-54.
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A third reason advanced to support parental tort immunity is the "fam-
ily exchequer" argument: to allow a child to recover compensation from
his parent would reduce the amount of family resources available for the
support of other children. 32 The prevalence of liability insurance in most
cases, including automobile negligence cases, moots this argument since
a source outside the family bears the cost of damages. 33 The family ex-
chequer argument also fails because it "leaves out of the picture the de-
pletion of the child's assets of health and strength through the injury." 34
The fourth argument favoring immunity is that a parent and child may
collude to defraud the parent's liability insurer. 35 Although there is
greater opportunity for collusion in such cases, the possibility of collusion
merely requires the court to proceed with greater caution. 36 The law al-
lows tort suits in other situations fraught with the possibility of collusion,
such as those between close friends, driver and guest, 37 and husband and
wife. 38 As in those cases, the potential for fraud is not a sufficient reason
to immunize tortfeasors from liability. 39
Driving an automobile has little to do with parental control and discipline. It is difficult to envision
a situation in which a finding of negligence in driving, either by judge or jury, would effectively
challenge a parent's authority over a child.
32. The family exchequer argument originated with Roller:
[T~he public has an interest in the financial welfare of other minor members of the family, and
it would not be the policy of the law to allow the estate, which is to be looked to for the support
of all the minor children, to be appropriated by any particular one.
37 Wash. at 245, 79 P. at 789.
The plaintiff in Roller sought $2000, and had attached the homestead of the defendant. Since the
other minor children of the defendant were residing there and were motherless, the court's concern
for them is understandable. The exchequer theory does not withstand legal analysis, however. See
notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
33. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
34. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 909 (1930). In other words, even if a family's
own resources are used to compensate the injured child, such a result may be desirable as public
policy since the child, through the injury, may have greater need for the resources than do the other
children.
35. Under this argument, immunity is justified because the suit may be so friendly that collusion
might be involved. This is the "flip side" of the family tranquility argument, that the suit would be so
unfriendly that it would disturb the household peace. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 653, 251 P.2d at
154.
36. "Courts must depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious
from the fraudulent in particular cases." Id. at 653, 251 P.2d at 155.
37. At one time, Washington had a host-guest statute providing immunity. The purpose was
to prevent collusion between host and guest to defraud insurance companies. WASH. REV. CODE §
46.08.080 (1970), repealed, 1974 Wash. Laws, Ist Ex. Sess., ch. 3 § 1.
38. See Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The court rejected this fraud-
collusion argument because it "presupposes that courts are so ineffectual and the jury system is so
imperfect that fraudulent claims cannot be distinguished from the legitimate." Id. at 189, 500 P.2d at
775, quoting Goode v. Martinis, 58 Wn. 2d 229, 234, 361 P.2d 941, 945 (1961).
39. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 653, 251 P.2d at 155.
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The fifth argument is based upon an analogy to the husband-wife rela-
tionship.40 Historically, that relationship was protected by a tort immu-
nity. The Borst court realized that the analogy is faulty because there is no
legal identity of parent and child, as there previously was between hus-
band and wife. 41 Moreover, since Borst, the Washington Supreme Court
has abrogated the doctrine of intraspousal tort immunity. 42 Therefore, the
fifth argument in support of parental immunity is groundless.
After making the above analysis, 43 the Borst court concluded that the
only remaining rationale for immunity is to allow parents to exercise dis-
cretion in fulfilling their duty to rear and discipline their children. 44 Since
the operation of an automobile is not uniquely a parental function, the
Borst analysis supports subjecting a parent to suit in automobile negli-
gence cases.
C. Subsequent Limitation of the Borst Analysis
The Washington Supreme Court initially followed the Borst analysis.
Subsequently, however, some of the Borst court's reasoning was misin-
terpreted, and parents were largely immune from suit in automobile negli-
gence cases until Merrick v. Sutterlin.
After Borst, the court first addressed the issue of parental tort immunity
in DeLay v. DeLay.45 A minor sought recovery from his father for inju-
40. E.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388,77 S.W. 664 (1903).
41. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wn. 2d at 654,251 P.2d at 155.
42. Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). See notes 25 & 38 supra.
43. The Borst court also noted several other reasons that have been offered in support of the rule
of parental tort immunity: (1) that the parent may inherit any money the child recovers in such an
action; (2) that the child might be permitted to bring a stale action after reaching majority; and (3) that
the concept of a sovereign family government demands the immunity rule. The Borst court dis-
counted these reasons as too insubstantial to warrant judicial consideration. 41 Wn. 2d at 655, 251
P.2d at 155-56.
44. The court stated:
The duty to discipline the child carries with it the right to chastise and to prescribe a course of
conduct designed for the child's development and welfare. This in turn demands that the parents
be given a wide sphere of discretion.
In order that these parental duties may adequately be performed, it is necessary that the par-
ents be not subject. to the risk of suit at the hands of their children. If such suits were common-
place, or even possible, the freedom and willingness of the father and mother to provide for the
needs, comforts and pleasures of the family would be seriously impaired. Public policy therefore
demands that parents be given immunity from such suits while in the discharge of parental du-
ties.
41 Wn. 2d at 656, 251 P.2d at 156.
45. 54 Wn. 2d 63, 337 P.2d 1057 (1959).
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ies resulting from allegedly negligent supervision. 46 The DeLay court
held the father immune because the father had knowingly acted in his
parental capacity. 47 This result comported with the Borst analysis because
the parent was arguably acting within the necessary scope of discretion
envisioned in Borst.
In Hoffman v. Tracy,48 a minor child sued her mother's estate for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident caused by her mother's
drunkenness. 49 The court affirmed a jury verdict for the child. It reasoned
that when a parent takes a child in an automobile and drives it while in-
toxicated, that parent is "temporarily abdicating [her] parental responsi-
bilities." 50 Under the circumstances, the parent's estate was denied
immunity.51
A year later, in Stevens v. Murphy,52 the issue was whether minor chil-
dren could sue their parent for personal injuries resulting fromt that par-
ent's alleged gross negligence in operating an automobile. 53 At the time
of the accident, the father was transporting his children to visit their
grandmother. The court stated that this act "was an exercise of his paren-
46. The minor son asked his father for money to buy some gasoline for his automobile. The
father refused and directed the boy to drain some gasoline from his logging truck. While the boy was
removing the plug in the bottom of the tank, the gas ignited and burned him. Through a guardian ad
litem, the boy sued his father. Plaintiff received a judgment which was reversed on appeal. Id. at 64,
337 P.2d at 1058.
47. Id. The court also held that the son was not emancipated although he was living away from
his father and without his support. Id. at 65, 337 P.2d at 1058. Emancipation was the main issue in
the case.
48. 67 Wn. 2d 31,406 P.2d 323 (1965).
49. The minor child was injured when the car in which she was a passenger went off the highway
and struck a utility pole. The mother, who was driving, the owner of the car, and the minor's younger
brother were all killed in the accident. A guardian ad litem brought suit on the child's behalf against
the estate of her mother and that of the owner of the car. Evidence of the mother's intoxication was
introduced at trial and the jury was instructed that they could find for plaintiff if they found that the
mother was driving while intoxicated and that the intoxication was a proximate cause of the accident.
The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. Id. at 32-33,406 P.2d at 324.
50. Id. at 38, 406 P.2d at 327. The court relied heavily on Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218
P.2d 445 (1950), cited with approval inBorst, 41 Wn. 2d at 656-57, 251 P.2d at 156.
51. While the result in Hoffman may be desirable, the court's analysis strayed from the Borst
reasoning because it assumed that a parent needs discretion to drive an automobile-its decision
turning on a finding that the parent abused that discretion. This assumption became the basis of the
decision in Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966), which severely limited the
Borst reasoning. See notes 52-61 and accompanying text infra.
52. 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966).
53. On defendant father's motion, the trial court dismissed the action against him. On appeal,
plaintiff did not attempt a frontal attack on the parental tort immunity doctrine under the Borst analy-
sis. Instead, plaintiff argued that the court should create two narrow exceptions to the doctrine: (1) it
does not apply when a parent loses custody by a divorce decree; and (2) it does not apply if the
parent's conduct constitutes gross negligence. Id.
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tal responsibility." 54 Accordingly, the court held that parental immunity
applied.
A careful reading of Borst v. Borst55 indicates that Stevens was decided
incorrectly. Under the Borst analysis, 56 the only reason for holding a par-
ent immune from suit is because he was acting within the scope of discre-
tion needed to fulfill his parental obligations. 57 In Stevens, the father's
decision to take his children on a visit to their grandmother undoubtedly
related to the children's upbringing and was indeed within his parental
discretion. What the Stevens court ignored, however, is that the father
was not being sued for his decision to take the children visiting; he was
being sued for negligently making a left turn.58 Arguably, the pertinent
relationship between the parties at the time of making the left turn was
that of driver and passenger, not parent and child. 59 Nevertheless, the
Stevens decision constricted Borst60 and prevented litigation between a
child and a parent for the parent's negligent, nonbusiness operation of an
automobile. In Merrick v. Sutterlin,61 the Washington Supreme Court
overturned Stevens and approved the Borst analysis.'
II. THE MERRICK DECISION
In Merrick v. Sutterlin,62 the court traced the development of the doc-
trine of parental tort immunity and its treatment in Washington. The court
specifically approved the Borst court's analysis of the policy considera-
tions often advanced as justifications for the immunity. 63 Noting that par-
ental immunity has been generally condemned by academicians, the court
also observed that the trend of modem cases is to limit or abolish the
doctrine.
54. Id. at 947, 421 P.2d at 673.
55. 41 Wn. 2d 642,251 P.2d 149 (1952).
56. See notes 18-44 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
58. Plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by their father's gross negligence in making
a left turn off a highway. 69 Wn. 2d at 940-41,421 P.2d at 669.
59. The parent-child relationship adds nothing to the duty to operate one's vehicle safely. See
Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50-51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 396, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (1974);
Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1968). Thus, for such a task, a parent
should not need the discretion provided by immunity.
60. The Stevens decision limits Borst by making a business-nonbusiness distinction. Under this
interpretation, Borst turned not on the nature of the father's conduct (driving) but rather on the pur-
pose for which the truck was used. This interpretation conflicts with the Borst court's emphasis on
examining the nature of the parent tortfeasor's conduct. See note 44 supra.
61. 93Wn.2d411,610P.2d891 (1980).
62. Id.
63. See notes 18-44 and accompanying text supra.
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Accordingly, the Merrick court overturned Stevens v. Murphy64 and
held that a minor child injured by his parent's negligence in an automo-
bile accident has a cause of action against that parent. 65 The court de-
clined to adopt a broad holding that would have abolished the immunity
entirely. The court also declined to specify the extent to which the doc-
trine would be retained. 66 Instead, such issues were reserved for future
consideration on a "case-by-case" basis.
III. ANALYSIS
The Merrick court decided to narrow the scope of its decision by leav-
ing to future cases the question of what portions of the parental tort immu-
nity doctrine would be retained. 67 The court had two alternatives to this
case-by-case approach. First, the court could have promulgated a com-
prehensive rule purporting to state the kinds of conduct for which a parent
would be immune. Second, the court could have abrogated the immunity
altogether. In light of the problems likely to be engendered by a case-by-
case approach or by a comprehensive rule, this note concludes that the
abrogation of the doctrine of parental tort immunity in its entirety would
have been the best course.
A. The Case-by-Case Approach
The Merrick court's reluctance to abrogate the doctrine of parental tort
immunity is understandable since some form of the doctrine has been a
part of Washington law for three-quarters of a century. Ideally, a case-by-
case determination would allow the court to continue narrowing the appli-
cation of the doctrine on a reasoned basis. Each issue would be fully
briefed, and thus previously unforeseen problems could be avoided. This
approach, however, will cause a temporary uncertainty of the law. Attor-
neys will not know when a suit can be maintained, in spite of a case's
apparent merits. 68 When suit is brought, the losing party will be encour-
aged to appeal as long as the law in this area is in a state of flux.
The more critical problem with the court's opinion is that it implicitly
envisions the retention of the doctrine in some cases. 69 To the extent that
64. 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966).
65. 93 Wn. 2d at 416, 610 P.2d at 893.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. The Merrick court provides little guidance to attorneys other than to note that some "situa-
tions of parental authority and discretion... should not lead to liability." Id.
69. See note 68 supra. The court stated further that the details of any portion of the immunity that
should be retained would be developed on a case-by-case determination. Id.
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this assumption is true, a case-by-case approach may cause the law to
become convoluted and burdened with artificial and arbitrary distinctions.
As future courts proceed on the task of deciding whether immunity
should be retained in a particular case, they must be guided by the only
remaining rationale-for the doctrine: that parents need.broad discretion to
fulfill their parental duties. 70 Thus, in each case, the court must answer
two questions to determine whether immunity should be granted. First,
does the parent need discretion for the type of conduct involved in the
case before the court? Second, did the parent abuse his discretion?
There can be no generally applicable rule dictating when a parent needs
discretion. Each court must answer this question in light of the particular
facts of the case before it. If an appellate court retains parental tort immu-
nity'in a particular case, it creates a precedent. Under stare decisis, a sub-
sequent court will have to review the facts of the case before it and com-
pare them with those of cases with precedential value. If the court decides
that the immunity should be retained, it must distinguish the case from
prior cases where the immunity was held inapplicable. Conversely, if the
court does not grant the immunity, it must distinguish the case from cases
where the immunity was retained. There is, however, no clear line of
demarcation between parental conduct that requires discretion and con-
duct that does not.71 Consequently, a case-by-case determination of when
immunity should be retained may result in artificial distinctions. 72
70. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
71. Indeed, when it first created the parental immunity doctrine in Washington, the Roller court
made a similar conclusion regarding immunity in general.
[I]f it be once established that a child has a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical
line of demarkatiop which can be drawn; for the same principle which would allow the action in
the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved in this case, would allow an action to be
brought for any other tort. The principle permitting the action would be the same. The torts
w6uld be different only in degree.
37 Wash. 242, 244, 79 P. 788, 789 (1905).
The futility of attempting to make such a differefntiation has led one judge to concude that "[i]f the
immunity from suit is .removed for an automobile tort, it follows logically that it is removed for all
negligent tcts . Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282, 286 (1970) (McFarland, J.,
dissenting).
72. If DeLay v. DeLay, 54 Wn. 2d 63, 337 P.2d 1057 (1959), is still maintained along with
Merrick, the potential for artificial distinctions is easily realized. Under DeLay, see notes 46-47 and
accompanying text supra, a subsequent court may logically hold that a parent is immune from any
claims of negligent supervision. Under Merrick, a subsequent court may logically hold that a parent
is vulnerable to suit for the negligent operation of any vehicle or tool. What then should a court do in
a case in which a child is injured by a rock flying from a power mower operated by his father? Under
this hypothetical, was the accident caused by the father's negligence in operating the mower too close
to his child, thus presumably vulnerable to suit, or was it caused by the father's negligence in su-
pervising the child and allowing him to get too close, thus presumably immune? Either view would
require an artificial distinction.
To an extent, New Jersey has faced the problem above. In a case closely analogous to Merrick, the
court abrogated parental tort immunity for injuries arising from the parent's negligence in operating
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A consideration of governmental immunity, for example, illustrates the
danger of determining the applicability of an immunity on a case-by-case
basis. To limit the doctrine of governmental immunity, Washington
courts allowed suit if the negligence of the defendant municipality,
through its officers and employees, was in the exercise of its corporate,
private, or proprietary powers, but not if the negligence was in the exer-
cise of its governmental, public, or legislative duties. 73 Decisions inter-
preting the immunity resulted in distinctions that were barely discernible
and, hence, heavily criticized. 74 Governmental immunity became
"fraught with technicalities and absurd distinctions, ' 75 and decisions
were made "in accordance with a mass of confused rules and ponderous
maxims." ,76 The cause of the problem was the same as that present in the
doctrine of parental immunity-a difficulty in distinguishing between im-
mune and non-immune conduct. 77 If portions of the parental immunity
doctrine are retained on a case-by-case approach, the doctrine may be
expected to become similarly convoluted. 78
an automobile. France v. A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970). As in Merrick,
the court provided no further guidance than to state that "there may be areas involving the exercise of
parental authority and care over a child which should not be justiciable in a court of law." 267 A.2d
at 494. Subsequently, a lower appellate court allowed a suit for a child's injuries sustained while the
father was mowing the lawn. Gross v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 158 N.J. Super. 442, 386 A.2d 442
(App. Div. 1978). The court in this case stressed the affirmative nature of the father's act while
belittling the evidence supporting a claim of negligent supervision. Two trial courts, however, have
issued opinions on the issue of negligent supervision, each reaching a contrary conclusion. See Fritz
v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 371 A.2d 833 (Law Div. 1977) (parents immune from a claim of
negligent supervision when their child was injured by falling into an excavation); Convery v.
Maczka, 163 N.J. Super. 411, 394 A.2d 1250 (Law Div. 1978) (mother not immune from a claim of
negligent supervision when her child was injured when he jumped off a chair).
73. Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. 694, 696, 66 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1937). The Wash-
ington legislature has since changed the law of sovereign immunity. See WASH. REv. CODE § 4.92.-
090(1974).
74. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955), Justice Frankfurter described
the distinctions as a "quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal corporations." He stated
further: "[T]he decisions in each of the States are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos
when courts try to apply a rule of law that is inherently unsound." Id.
For a partial bibliography of critical discussions in this area of law, see Comment, Abolition of
Sovereign Immunity in Washington, 36 WASH. L. REV. 312, 313 (1961).
75. Comment, Abolition of Sovereign Immunity in Washington, supra note 74, at 316.
76. Id.
77. Hagerman v. City of Seattle, 189 Wash. at 706, 66 P.2d at 1157 (Blake, J., dissenting). See
notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
78. The potential for such problems arising from a limited holding like that in Merrick has led
one court to conclude that "[pliecemeal abrogation of established law by judicial decree is, like a
partial amputation, ordinarily unwise and usually unsuccessful." Skinner v. Whitley, 281 N.C. 476,
189 S.E.2d 230, 235 (1972).
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The second question, whether a parent hag abused his discretion, will
lead to the same problem as the first question, whether a parent needs
discretion. Under Hoffman v. Tracy,79 a parent's discretion is limited to
conduct not amounting to willful misconduct; if he acts with willful mis-
conduct, then he will be held to have "temporarily abdicat[ed] his paren-
tal responsibilities" 80 and will not be granted immunity from his child's
suit.
A judicial determination of willful misconduct is the same in principle
as a judicial determination of negligence by establishing specific rules of
conduct as matters of law.81 Justice Holmes believed that the latter propo-
sition was desirable; he felt that such standards'ought increasingly to be
fixed by the court so that people would know in advance, to the greatest
possible extent, just what they are supposed to do in any given circum-
stance. 82 These decisions would provide notice to people of what consti-
tutes tortious conduct, thereby allowing them to adjust their conduct ac-
cordingly. Such rules of conduct, however, lack flexibility, and thus their
mechanical application may result in unjust decisions that could be
avoided only by making artificial distinctions. As a result, Holmes' posi-
tion has been heavily criticized and the trend in this century has been
against judges "forming standards of behavior that amount to rules of
law.''83 Washington courts have generally declined- to determine negli-
79. 67 Wn. 2d 31, 406 P.2d 323 (1965). See notes 48-50 and accompanying text supra.
80. 67 Wn. 2d at 38,406 P.2d at 327.
81. Willful misconduct is not negligence. Adkisson v. City of Seattle, 42 Wn. 2d 676; 682,258
P.2d 461, 465 (1953). Like negligence, however, it is typically a question of fact for the jury. Id. at
683, 258 P.2d at 465.
82. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 110-12 (1881). This notion reached its highwater mark in
Justice Holmes' opinion in Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). In that case,
Holmes wrote that a driver of an automobile is contributorily negligent as a matter of law if he does
not stop at a railroad track and get out of his vehicle to see if a train is dangerously near, when he
cannot otherwise tell. Six years later, the Supreme Court reversed the decision in Pokora v. Wabash
Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1933). Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo held that the existence of a duty
to stop depends upon the circumstances, and hence, generally, even if not invariably, upon the judg-
ment of the jury. He noted that the inflexibility of such rules of law would result, when applied in
some cases, in poor and unjust decisions. Id. at 103-06.
83. Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. at 105. See note 82 supra; see James, Accident Liability:
Some Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L.J. 365, 375 (1946). See also Morehouse v. City of Everett,
141 Wash. 399, 252 P. 157 (1926) (rejecting a "drive within the radius of your lights" rule in favor
of the jury determining negligence under the reasonably prudent person standard).
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gence as a matter of law 84 and have specifically refused to do so in cases
involving parental conduct. 85
Washington courts should also avoid deciding the applicability of
immunity by determining as a matter of law whether a parent has abused
his discretion by willful misconduct. Initially, such determinations may
provide notice to parents of when they are immune, a desirable result only
if one assumes that tort law affects behavior. Even if the validity of this
assumption is conceded, the inflexibility of making such determinations
as a matter of law will result in artificial distinctions in subsequent
cases, 86 and thus any certainty as to what is or is not immune conduct will
be diminished. Indeed, this uncertainty undercuts the only remaining ra-
tionale supporting the immunity. In Borst v. Borst, 87 the court said that to
ensure that parents adequately perform their duties "it is necessary that
the parents be not subject to the risk of suit at the hands of their chil-
dren." 88 Determining the immunity on a case-by-case basis, however,
leaves the parent uncertain about his immunity. Thus, he is subject to the
risk of suit, and the reason for the immunity fails.
B. The Comprehensive Rule Approach
The Merrick court could have adopted a comprehensive rule purporting
to state specific kinds of conduct for which a parent is immune. In Goller
v. White, 89 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted such a rule. The court
84. The court in McQuillan v. City of Seattle, 10 Wash. 464, 38 P. 1119 (1895), set forth the
only two classes of cases in which the question of negligence may be determined by the court as a
matter of law:
The first is where the circumstances of the case are such that the standard of duty is fixed, and
the measure of duty defined, by law, and is the same under all circumstances. And the second is
where the facts are undisputed, and but one reasonable inference can be drawn from them. If
different results might be honestly reached by different minds then negligence is not a question
of law, but one of fact for the jury.
Id. at 466, 38 P. at 1120 (citations omitted).
This first category refers generally to those cases where the standard of care is clearly defined by
statute and remains the same under all circumstances, such as cases involving negligence per se.
Breivo v. City of Aberdeen, 15 Wn. App. 520, 525, 550 P.2d 1164, 1168 (1976). There is no such
standard for parental conduct.
85. See Sundstrom v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 90 Wash. 640, 156 P. 828
(1916) (declining to find parents contributorily negligent as a matter of law for sending children, three
and seven-years-old, to the neighborhood store; issue was for jury); Bruner v. Little, 97 Wash. 319,
166 P. 1166 (1917) (declining to find parents contributorily negligent as a matter of law for letting
eight-year-old child cross the street unattended).
86. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra (noting that determining as a matter of law
when a parent needs discretion and therefore has immunity, will lead to untenable distinctions).
87. 41 Wn. 2d 642,251 P.2d 149 (1952).
88. Id. at 656, 251 P.2d at 156.
89. 20Wis. 2d402, 122N.W.2d 193 (1963).
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in that case abrogated the doctrine of parental tort immunity except: "(1)
where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority
over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exer-
cise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food,
clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. "90
The Goller approach is plagued with the same defects as a case-by-case
approach since "the problems inherent in construing the ... exceptions
present a real danger of arbitrary line-drawing." 91 These problems arise
because it is impossible to set forth a rule of law that states when a child
can and cannot sue his parents that can be universally applied. Not sur-
prisingly, the Wisconsin court and other courts92 adopting this compre-
hensive rule have had difficulty in applying it to particular factual situa-
tions. 93 Significantly, one of the states originally following the Goller
90. Id. at413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
91. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595,598 (Minn. 1980):
92. Michigan has adopted judicially a variation of the Goller rule of categorical exemption. See
Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (has variation of "reasonable parental
authority" in the first Goller exemption, and "reasonable parental discretion" in the second Goller
exemption). See also Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971). The addition of "reasonable"
in Plumley was done without further comment by the court. Presumably, however, under this formu-
lation of the rule, immunity within each exemption is not absolute. Indeed, the addition may make a
sham of the exemptions for "a literal interpretation of the modifier 'reasonable' would mean that a
parent is immune from liability only in situations where he is non-negligent in exercising his parental
authority [or discretion]." Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. 1980).
Minnesota had also adopted a variation of the Goller approach. See Silesky v. Kelman, 231 Minn.
431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968). In Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), however, the
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that approach and abolished the immunity entirely. See note.94
infra.
93. For example, after Goller was decided, the Wisconsin court was confronted with whether a
failure to give a child proper instructions on how to leave a school bus and cross a highway was
within a Goller exemption. Lemmen v. Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968). The court
held that such parental conduct was protected by an exemption. Two years later, the same court was
asked whether the negligent supervision of a child playing on a swing set fit within an exemption.
Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970). The court held that al-
though education falls within the protection of an exemption, the supervision of child's play did not.
Finally, in Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745
(1972), the court faced a factual situation in which a child, left alone in the living room while his
mother went to the neighbors, walked out of the house and ran in front of a bus. Relying on Lemmen,
the mother argued that her negligence was in failing to educate the child not to leave the house and
therefore that she was immune. Relying on Cole, the bus company, seeking contribution, argued that
her negligence was in not supervising the child properly and therefore that she was not immune. The
court recognized that the distinction between the two was artificial and overemphasized. Accord-
ingly, it held that in either case, the conduct did not fall within an exception, apparently overruling
Lemmen.
The Thoreson court stated that the exclusion was limited to "legal duties." Immunity did not
"extend to the ordinary acts of upbringing, whether in the nature of supervision or education which
are not of the same legal nature as providing food, clothing, housing, and medical and dental ser-
vices." Id. at 247, 201 N.W.2d at 753. This distinction between legal and moral duties of a parent
does not provide much better guidance for when a parent should be immune. Further, it too is an
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approach has recently rejected it in favor of abolishing the immunity doc-
trine entirely. 94 Likewise, instead of attempting to adopt a comprehensive
rule, Washington should simply abrogate parental tort immunity alto-
gether.
C. Abrogation of the Immunity
The only way the courts can avoid a quagmire caused by tenuous dis-
tinctions and confusing holdings is to abrogate the doctrine of parental
tort immunity entirely. A parent's liability would then be based upon the
jury deciding the issue of negligence, without a prior determination of
immunity by the court. A criticism of total abrogation is that the discre-
tion a parent needs to perform his obligations would no longer be safe-
guarded by the law. A response to this criticism is that the parent's discre-
tion may still be protected by making it part of the jury's consideration on
the issue of negligence. Thus, the questions of when a parent needs dis-
cretion and whether he has abused it, presently the court's focus in deter-
mining immunity, 95 would be part of the jury's inquiry of parental negli-
gence. This note therefore proposes abolishing the immunity; the
question of parental negligence should be determined by the jury in light
of its assessment of the discretion, if any, that the parent needs.
The jury is especially qualified to make these determinations. 96 The
questions of when and how much discretion is needed would be deter-
mined after the jury hears all the evidence in the case. A defendant par-
ent, for example, could adduce evidence showing that his conduct was
not tortious when cognizance is taken of the child's behavioral problems
or of the unique parent-child relationship involved. The jury could adjust
its view of reasonableness in light of all relevant circumstances. 97
artificial distinction for there is no logical basis for differentiating between legal duties and moral
duties. Comment, The "Reasonable Parent" Standard: An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immu-
nitv, 47 U. OF COLO. L. REV. 795, 808 (1976).
94. In Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), the Minnesota Supreme Court re-
jected the Goller approach it had adopted earlier in Silesky v. Kelman, 231 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d
631 (1968). The Anderson court reasoned that the standard was not very helpful for it would still
require a case-by-case analysis to determine whether or not the particular conduct at issue was within
one of the exemptions. Furthermore, the court was concerned that the standard added "to the poten-
tial of arbitrary decision-making in the area." 295 N.W.2d at 598. The determinative consideration
for the court's decision was "that the areas of parental authority and discretion, for which the Silesky
exceptions were designed to provide safeguards, can be effectively protected by use of a 'reasonable
parent standard'. " Id. See notes 104-19 and accompanying text infra.
95. See discussion accompanying note 70 supra.
96. See generally C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 35-38, 64-68 (1962); Clark, The
American Jury: A Justification, in SELECTED READINGS: THE JURY 1 (G. Winters ed. 1962). Of par-
ticular significance is the jury's ability to represent better society's norms and expectations.




Moreover, treating parental liability as a question of fact98 avoids the
growth of technical and artificial legal distinctions that may otherwise re-
suit. Since the jury's determination is not a rule of law, it applies only to
the case before it.99 Juries do not have to distinguish or overturn a prior
decision, as does a court when dealing with a rule of law that the court
feels would result in an unjust decision. Instead, each jury decides on the
particular merits and unique equities of the case before it. 100 Accordingly,
the law would not become fraught with artificial distinctions, as might
happen if the immunity doctrine is retained. 101
With the abolition of parental tort immunity, the factfinder could apply
a standard of care very similar to the "reasonable person" standard ordi-
narily applied. 102 Because, however, a parental tort occurs in the context
of a special relationship, the standard should be adjusted to account for
the parent's needed discretion. 103 Therefore, the factfinder should apply
a modified standard of the "reasonably prudent parent."
98. A fact is "something which has happened or existed," while law is typically defined as a
"body of principles and rules which are capable of being predicated in advance." Bohlen, Mixed
Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111, 112 (1924). The determination of reasonable
conduct by a jury is something between a finding of fact and a declaration of law. Id. at 115. Accord-
ingly, one commentator has suggested that "the terms 'law' and 'fact' are merely short terms for the
respective functions of judge and jury." L. GREEN, JuDcoE AND JURY 279 (1930). The important dif-
ference between these two functions is that a judicial ruling announces a fixed rule or principle to
which others must conform in the future. Bohlen, supra, at 116. A jury determination is only of
consequence to the immediate case before it. See note 99 infra.
99. L. GREEN, supra note 98, at 179. In Bohlen, supra note 98, the author states:
The decision of a jury determines the standard for the one case, and for that case only. It
operates only ex post facto. . . [A] standard, once used to determine the wrongfulness of the
act or omission of the defendant in a particular case, has fulfilled its purpose. It has no force,
binding or persuasive, in determining whether identical conduct under identical circumstances is
right or wrong. Thus, room is left for a change of standard when a change in the physical condi-
tions of life, or a change in the public valuation of the respective interests concerned, require
[sic] it.
Id. at 116-17.
100. It is important to be aware that although the question is one for the jury, the court still sets
"outer limits" within which the jury may decide. James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence
Cases, 58 YALE L.J. 667, 677 (1949). In addition to ruling on the sufficiency of proof, the judge
limits the jury by its instructions and by its rulings on evidence. Id. at 679-85. See also L. GREEN,
supra note 98, at 157-59; Bohlen, supra note 98, at 117.
101. See notes 71-85 and accompanying text supra.
102. Typically, a jury is instructed to make its determination of negligence by comparing the
conduct at issue with that expected of a reasonably prudent person acting under the same or similar
circumstances. Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 416 (1891); Chadwick v. Ek, 1
Wn. 2d 117, 95 P.2d 398 (1939); Morehouse v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 P. 157 (1926);
See James, supra note 100, at 676.
103. The reasonably prudent person has been a very adaptable standard. For example, it has been
adjusted at times to account for a child's conduct. Burget v. Saginaw Logging Co., 198 Wash. 61,
63, 86 P.2d 1117, 1118 (1939) (standard adjusted to consider the child's capacity, intelligence,
knowledge, experience and discretion, ability to remember instructions, and all attendant circum-
stances); Hanson v. Washington Water Power Co., 165 Wash. 497, 502, 5 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1931)
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IV. THE "REASONABLY PRUDENT PARENT" STANDARD
In the place of parental tort immunity, Washington courts should sub-
stitute a standard of care defined by the reasonably prudent parent's con-
duct. Under this standard, a jury would be instructed that it should not
find a parent liable for the injury of his child unless it finds that the parent
failed to act as a reasonably prudent parent under the same or similar cir-
cumstances.
In Gibson v. Gibson, 104 the California Supreme Court adopted such a
standard when it abrogated the parental tort immunity doctrine. 105 The
court recognized that the parent-child relationship is unique in many re-
spects and that traditional concepts of negligence should not be applied
without considering the nature of the relationship. 106 Accordingly, the
court held that "[t]he standard to be applied is the traditional one of rea-
sonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role." 107
Critics of this standard object to leaving the issue of parental negli-
gence to the jury because, they say, it is inappropriate for activity involv-
ing the unique parent-child relationship to be measured against a common
standard. 108 They are particularly skeptical about applying a common
(child required to exercise the care expected of a reasonably prudent person of the child's age and
understanding, under the same or similar circumstances). The standard has also been adjusted for a
blind person, e.g., Masterson v. Lennon, 115 Wash. 305, 197 P. 38 (1921), a physically disabled
person, e.g., Sterling v. New England Fish Co., 410 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Wash. 1975) or one with
special expertise, e.g., Jarrard v. Seifert, 22 Wn. App. 476, 591 P.2d 809 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.290 (1979) (standard for healing professions).
104. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
105. Id. Recently, in Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), the Minnesota Su-
preme Court also abrogated the doctrine of parental tort immunity and adopted the reasonably prudent
parent standard set forth in Gibson. See note 107 and accompanying text infra.
A few other states have made broad holdings purporting to abolish the doctrine. See Peterson v.
City & County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397,
528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Falco v. Pados, 444
Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (but note concurring opinion which added the caveat of the Goller
exemptions; see notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra). It is not clear with what these courts
have replaced the doctrine. Presumably they will apply a standard similar to the one in Gibson. See
note 107 and accompanying text infra.
106. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921,479 P.2d 648,652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971).
107. Id. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. In other words, the proper test of a
parent's conduct is: "[Wihat would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar
circumstances?" Id. (emphasis in original).
108. For example, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to adopt a reasonable parent standard be-
cause the citizens of its state were "too diverse and independent to be judged by a common standard
in such a delicate area as the parent-child relationship." Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho
1980). The New York court has expressed the same concern: "Considering the different economic,
educational, cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds which must prevail, there are so many combi-
nations and permutations of parent-child relationships that may result that the search for a standard
would necessarily be in vain-and properly so." Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 50, 324
N.E.2d 338, 346, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859, 871 (1974) (quoting lower court opinion, 43 A.D.2d 129, 135,
350 N.Y.S.2d 199, 204 (1973)).
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standard of reasonableness to a case where the duty allegedly breached is
one of supervision. 10 9 They are concerned that a standardized norm will
constrict a parent's discretion to make difficult judgments concerning
how much independence a child should have to mature and develop prop-
erly. 110
This criticism is not well founded. It presumes that the reasonably pru-
dent parent standard is a totally objective standard that clearly outlines
what a parent can and cannot do. To the contrary, like the reasonable
person standard, the reasonable parent standard is never defined in terms
of particular qualities and characteristics of human conduct.111 Rather,
the reasonable person is the personification of each court's or jury's social
judgment after hearing the merits of the particular case. 112 Thus, there is
109. A 6laim of negligent supervision usually arises in the context of a child suing a third party
who then seeks contribution from the child's parents. Most courts that have recently ruled on a claim
of negligent supervision have rejected it and upheld immunity in this setting. Horton v. Reaves, 186
Colo. 149, 526 P.2d 304 (1974); Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783 (1972); Schneider
v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979); Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560 (Idaho 1980); Vaughan v.
Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); Paige v. Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App.
480, 233 N.W.2d 46 (1975); Fritz v. Anderson, 148 N.J. Super. 68, 371 A.2d 833 (Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1977) ; Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). See
also Thomas v. Inmos, 594 S.W.2d 853 (Ark. 1980).
A few courts have recognized negligent supervision as a cause of action. American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Petersen v. City
& County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595
(Minn. 1980); Cole v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177 N.W.2d 866 (1970). See also Lee
v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
The reluctance to allow a claim of negligent supervision may-be due to a concern that a parent may
hesitate to initiate a suit on the child's behalf against a third party because of the fear that he too may
be liable. A parent's automobile liability insurance may not protect him against a third party tortfea-
sor seeking contribution for alleged negligent supervision of the child. Instead, a parent would need a
comprehensive homeowner's policy or other liability insurance.
Although Washington is a comparative negligence state, it-does not at present recognize contribu-
tion. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978). The
court explicitly left open the option, however, to adopt judicially the doctrine of contribution: "t'W]e
neither hold nor mean to suggest that we will reject further consideration of this matter in an appropri-
ate case." Id. at 854, 576 P.2d at 392.
110. See, e.g., Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980). Parents are thought to have
need of discretion in the supervision of their children because "[e]ach parent has unique and inimit-
able methods and attitudes on how children should be supervised. Likewise, each child requires indi-
vidualized guidance depending on intuitive concerns which only a parent can understand." Paige v.
Bing Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 233 N.W.2d 46, 49 (1975).
111. See Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 416-17 (1891); L. GREEN, supra
note 98, at 164, 173-74; Bohlen, supra note 98, at 113.
112. Bohlen, supra note 98, at 113. See generally L. GRIN, supra note 98. In chapter five of
this book, Professor Green argues that the reasonably prudent person is a "ritualistic formula," a
mere figure of speech that courts use in translating the negligence issue for the jury's judgment and in
articulating a decision for purposes of a record. It serves as a prophylaxis. As a statement, it appears
to be objective; however, when the jury passes judgment, the standard is no more than a sobering.
caution to the jury that they are dealing with society's power and not their own. Thus, each of the
possible assortments of qualities and characteristics of the persons involved may be a factor in the
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an element of subjectivity 13 within the standard that allows for the con-
sideration of all peculiar factors involving parent and child in that particu-
lar case. 114 The reasonably prudent parent standard would also allow the
jury to consider the practical responsibilities, expectations, and limita-
tions that flow from the parent-child relationship. 115
Admittedly, even though the reasonably prudent parent is a subjective
standard, a parent's conduct would receive the scrutiny of a jury. Conse-
quently, the parent's discretion in raising his children may be limited.
The parent, however, would not be subjected to any greater examination
nor to any greater risk of second-guessing than that to which the court
would subject him when it determines immunity by answering the ques-
tions whether a parent needs discretion and whether the parent has abused
it. 116 Furthermore, to ameliorate any potential problems of prejudice, ju-
ries can be reminded that reasonable parents can disagree over the best
method of raising a child. Appropriate instructions would help to ensure
that parents will be given the proper discretion to perform their duties.
The successful application of a similar standard to parental conduct in
cases of imputed negligence attests to the feasibility of the reasonably
prudent parent standard. 117 Also, Washington courts have successfully
jury's judgment. In other words, there is an important subjective aspect to the reasonably prudent
person, or in this case, the reasonably prudent parent. Id. at 153-85. See note 113 infra.
113. See Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1927). In this
classic statement, Professor Seavey concludes "that there is no standardized man; that there is only in
part an objective test; that there is no such thing as reasonable or unreasonable conduct except as
viewed with reference to certain qualities of the actor .... "Id. at 27. By adapting the standard to
the reasonably prudent parent, the special considerations of being a parent are emphasized.
114. Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 347, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340,
350 (1974) (Fuchsberg, J., concurring).
[Alside from the facts relating to the negligence itself, such variable matters as age, mental
and physical health, intelligence, aptitudes and needs of the child involved; the presence in the
family of other children competing for parental time and attention; and the economic, social and
physical environment in which the parental conduct occurs, all may be expected to play a part.
115. Id.
116. See discussion accompanying note 70 supra.
In Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980), the court expressly allayed the fear that
juries cannot make these decisions responsibly.
[W]e reject the contention that juries are incapable of rationally and equitably deciding whether
a parent has acted negligently in exercising his parental control and discretion. Our system of
justice places great faith injuries, and we see no compelling reason to distrust their effectiveness
in the parent-child context.
Id. at 600.
117. At one time, there was a rule of imputing a parent's contributory negligence to his child.
Washington abrogated this doctrine at an early date. E.g., Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525,
545-46, 43 P. 641, 647 (1896). In those cases in which the doctrine was still maintained, the par-
ent's conduct was judged against a standard of reasonableness much as it would be in cases between
parent and child. A multitude of factors were considered. See, e.g., Murray v. Scranton Ry., 36 Pa.
Super. Ct. 576, 580 (1908) ("The situation of the parents, the character of their home, the weather,
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applied a standard of reasonableness to parents in cases in which parents
seek to recover in their own right for expenses arising from a child's in-
jury." 8 Likewise in criminal law, a standard of reasonableness has been
applied to activity arising from the parent-child relationship. 119
The reasonably prudent parent standard is a workable mechanism by
which a jury can make its decision. Resort to the standard avoids the
problems engendered by an obscure immunity doctrine. Moreover, sub-
jecting parental conduct to a jury's scrutiny under this standard ensures
that clearly unacceptable conduct will give rise to tort liability. At the
same time, parents are provided adequate discretion to discharge the obli-
gations of parenting.
V. CONCLUSION
A basic principle of tort law is that one who has been injured by an-
other's tortious conduct should be compensated by the tortfeasor. Thus,
liability is the rule; immunity is an exception. As an exception, parental
tort immunity cannot be adequately justified. Borst v. Borst was an im-
portant step in recognizing this conclusion. Merrick v. Sutterlin was a
logical extension of the Borst analysis. Unfortunately, Merrick suggests
that the doctrine may still be applied to some kinds of parental conduct.
To do so, however, would be inappropriate. A piecemeal application of
immunity to conduct that cannot be clearly differentiated will result in
arbitrary distinctions and a confusion of the law in this area. Washington
would do better by totally abandoning the doctrine of parental tort immu-
nity. Consequently, the Borst-Merrick transition of allowing suit for auto-
the health of the children, their manner of living, and all the attending surroundings are elements to
be considered .... ").
118. E.g., Vinnette v. Northern Pac. R.R., 47 Wash. 320, 91 P. 975 (1907); Cox v. Hugo, 52
Wn. 2d 815, 329 P.2d 467 (1958). In Cox, the court quoted favorably from Doren v. Northwestern
Baptist Hosp. Ass'n, 240 Minn. 181, 191-92, 60 N.W.2d 361, 368 (1953): "The rule is well estab-
lished that a parent is required to exercise that degree of care for a child which a reasonably prudent
person would exercise under the same conditions." 52 Wn. 2d at 821, 329 P.2d at 470.
The Cox court then held that parents are not negligent in the care of their children simply by
allowing the children to play outside without their constant surveillance. In refusing to impose such
an impracticable standard, the court stated that "[p]arents are not required to restrain their children
within doors at their peril." Id. at 820, 329 P.2d at 470.
119. State v. Williams, 4 Wn. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971). In this case, a husband and wife
were found guilty of manslaughter for negligently failing to provide their child with medical attention
necessary for the child's survival. To raise the defense of excusable homicide, defendants would have
had to have exercised "ordinary caution." The court defined ordinary caution as "the kind of caution
that a man of reasonable prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances." Id. at




mobile negligence should be extended by subsequent courts to all parental
conduct. If parents are thought to need discretion for certain conduct, this
may still be protected by the factfinder's use of a reasonably prudent par-
ent standard.
Frederick W. Grimm
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